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INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
As commercial space transportation demand increases, so will the number of 
scheduled launch dates. The aerospace industry is very different from other industries in the 
United States of America (USA). According to Wensveen “The combination of technological 
uncertainty and long lead times, often 7-10 years and frequently longer, between program 
initiation and completion, makes advance estimation of cost particularly difficult” (Wensveen, 
2008, p.6).  Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) is in the process of shifting 
the 20
th  
Century USA vertical launch vehicle, space transportation 
manufacturing/assembly/testing/launch paradigm into the lean and cost efficient 21
st 
Century 
USA vertical launch vehicle, space manufacturing/assembly/testing/launch paradigm defined 
on their website as follows: 
In an era when most technology based products follow a path of ever-increasing 
capability and reliability while simultaneously reducing costs, launch vehicles today are 
little changed from those of 40 years ago. SpaceX aims to change this paradigm by 
  
developing a family of launch vehicles which will ultimately reduce the cost and 
increase the reliability of space access by a factor of ten. Coupled with the newly 
emerging market for private and commercial space transport, this new model will re-
ignite humanity's efforts to explore and develop Space. 
(SpaceX, Company Overview, n.d.) 
 
Future vertical launch spaceport operations teams and customers will need to know the 
parameters associated with vertical launch scheduling to properly plan launching from the Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport. This includes the mean number of days between initial and actual launch 
dates, the mean number of reschedule dates, and the mean number of days between initial and 
reschedule dates per mission. There does not appear to be any collective data analysis of this 
sort concerning vertical launch schedules from Cape Canaveral Spaceport. Providing analysis, 
for the 2008-2009 vertical launches, at this site, will provide a preliminary glimpse of key 
factors to spaceport launch operation teams and customers to properly allocate resources and 
forecast vertical launch support system supply and demand requirements. 
History 
The decision to designate Cape Canaveral as the USA‟s vertical launch vehicle 
spaceport, for payload and human spaceflight, was made for very specific reasons. This 
location offers an eastern launch inclination, a safe distance from populated areas, over the vast 
expanse of the Atlantic, placing the hardware far above population‟s harm, and into orbit. 
Seller‟s states “ …the benefit of being closer to the equator for equatorial orbits, and the added 
velocity from the Earth‟s rotation rate…” (2005, p.614) were the other key factors.  Cape 
Canaveral was designated as the Air Force‟s Eastern Test Range in 1964.  The Mercury and 
Gemini missions launch from this site under the control of the 
Air Force‟s 45th Space Wing (45th SW).  When the National Aeronautics and Space 
 
Administration (NASA) embarked on the Apollo program, they moved the John F. Kennedy 
  
Space Center (KSC), human spaceflight launch operations, to Merritt Island where they 
constructed launch complexes 39A and 39B.  The State of Florida/KSC/45
th 
SW, under the 
State‟s space agency, created a Spaceport Master Plan for the State, in 2002, and designated the 
areas of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and KSC as the Cape Canaveral 
Spaceport. The State of Florida‟s recently completed Spaceport Master Plan 2010 refers to this 
site as the Cape Canaveral Spaceport, as well. This definition serves as the collective 
description of spaceport activities within the CCAFS/KSC areas, as the State‟s space 
transportation, multimodal system component. The other components are air, sea, rail, and 
highway systems.  The Cape Canaveral Spaceport is fortunate to have all four systems 
strategically tied into their daily activities to support vertical launch activities taking people, 
goods, and services outside our atmosphere and beyond. The environment outside our 
atmosphere has been our frontier for the last 51 years. 
The space launch enterprise has been historically championed by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the NASA in the USA. The International Space Station‟s (ISS) 
requirements concerning re-supplying and ferrying humans to and from the world‟s first space 
outpost moved the NASA decision-makers to engage with national commercial space 
transportation organizations to perform these functions after the Shuttle program retired.  This 
program is the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. CCAFS, under 
the umbrella of the 45
th 
SW, is currently engaging with Space Command‟s „Launch Enterprise 
Transformation‟ to support future DOD, civil, exploration, and commercial launch efforts from 
licensed launch pads on their site.  
“Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services – Space Launch Complex (SLC) 41, 
United Launch Alliance (ULA)- SLC 37, and SpaceX-SLC 40 operate and launch from 
CCAFS, and hold Active Launch Licenses from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)/Aerospace Transportation (AST). The State of Florida‟s aerospace agency, Space 
Florida (SF), has an Active Site Operator License for SLC 46” (U.S. DOT, FAA( n.d.)  Active 
  
Licenses) designed to support solid launch vehicle activities, at CCAFS.  Though CCAFS is a 
DOD site, the need to support commercial space transportation requirements, with regard to 
national security, communication, remote sensing, exploration, experimentation, and human 
space flight, has been recognized. The utilization of this area for its original purposes is being 
understood anew. KSC is restructuring SLC 39B as the Space Launch System launch platform. 
SpaceX is retrofitting SLC 39A to support the Falcon9 Heavy Launch platform. 
The infancy of nonfederal, contracted, commercial space transportation is at hand. 
 
Future commercial launch transportation interest and demand is increasing. New information 
system architecture will need to be created to support the future multi- customer/multi-mission 
launch operations. Launch site, facilities processing, and launch operators, along with launch 
and payload customers, will need to know the parameters associated with launch scheduling at 
Cape Canaveral Spaceport, to properly allocate resources and forecast launch support system 
demand requirements. 
Statement of the Problem 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Cape Canaveral Spaceport actual 
launch schedule dates, delineated as initial, rescheduled, and actual launch dates, tracking only 
those mission launches with actual launch dates between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 
2009, to identify scheduling parameters for commercial space transportation allocation of 
spaceport resources based on the variables identified in the sub problems. 
Sub problems 
 
The first sub problem is to estimate the mean number of days between the initial 
scheduled launch date and the actual launch date. 
The second sub problem is to estimate the mean number of times a launch was 
rescheduled per mission. 
The third sub problem is to estimate the mean number of days between the scheduled 
dates per mission. 
  
The fourth sub problem is to investigate the percentage of planned scheduled launches 
vs. actual launches at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. 
Assumptions 
 
1. The data taken from the Space Flight Now Launch Log is correct 
 
2. This researcher captured the Space Flight Now Launch Log data correctly 
 
3. The dates used for the analysis are Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) dates 
 
 
Delimitations 
 
1. The lack of time to gather significant insight or data from the 45th SW, 1Range Operations 
(ROPS) Scheduling and the NASA scheduling authorities 
2. The time factor required to support new preliminary research 
 
3. This researcher‟s capacity as a novice in this field 
 
4. Lack of consistent time reporting throughout Spaceflight Now Log, some entries did not 
specify a specific day, but rather an early or late month entry. 
5. The findings and conclusions will be based on an investigation of the variables identified in the 
problem statement and sub problems. 
6. Unidentified confounding variables may have a negative impact on the findings and 
conclusions. 
7.   Although the research report is free of intentional bias, the researcher recognizes the 
probability of bias of some type and cautions the reader to be cognizant of that likelihood. 
Definition of Terms 
 
Cape Canaveral Spaceport – Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Kennedy Space Center sites 
Commercial Space Transportation – Launch vehicle and launch operations owned by private 
organizations providing services to the NASA, DOD, and other customers with launch 
requirements 
Launch-Window Sidereal Time (LWST) – “…local sidereal time (LST) for when the launch site is 
  
under the orbital plane (launch time)…Whenever the local sidereal time (at the launch site) 
equals the launch-window sidereal time (LST=LWST), the correct geometry exists to launch 
the spacecraft into the desired orbit” (Sellers, 2005, p.299). 
The Gooch Factor – Retired Col. Gooch‟s determination that 70% of the scheduled launches actual 
happen at the Eastern and Western Ranges. 
 
45
th 
SW 45
th 
Space Wing 
Acronyms 
AST Aerospace Transportation 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
COTS Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
DMS Delivery Management System 
DOD Department of Defense 
 
DOT Department of Transportation 
 
DSS Decision Support Systems 
 
EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FPD Fast Package Delivery 
 
GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
 
ISS International Space Station 
 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
 
LST Local Sidereal Time 
 
LWST Launch-Window Sidereal Time NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
  
 
NSRP National Spacelift Requirements Process 
NSRWG National Spacelift Requirements Working Group 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
ROPS Range Operations 
 
SATMS Space and Air Traffic Management System 
SLC Space Launch Complex 
SLMP Space Launch Master Plan 
 
SpaceX Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 
ULA United Launch Alliance 
U.S. United States 
 
USA United States of America 
U.S.  DOT United States Department of Transportation 
  
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
 
Introduction 
 
This study focused on the vertical launch schedule mean number of days 
between scheduled dates and the mean number of schedule dates per mission.  CCAFS 
oversees diverse launch operations and is the conduit between the NASA and commercial 
launch and payload operator providers at the Eastern Range. Range scheduling at CCAFS 
coordinates all launch schedule requests and coordinates all launch date rescheduling for Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport. Some reasons for launch dates to change include launch system failure, 
payload issues, weather, and down range issues ranging from stray sea vessels to aircraft 
navigating in the designated airspace. Clearing the three dimensional airspace, the size of the 
Eastern Range is a remarkable task. 
Managing Resources 
 
Sellers states, “Mission managers and operators must carefully spend scare resources – 
time, money, and people – while monitoring the eternal tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and 
performance. The schedule critical factor is as follows: 
1. To meet launch window requirements 
 
2. To meet spacecraft position requirements to serve paying customers The 
longer the time factor on the ground, the more additional costs accrue” (2005, p. 365). 
Future Aerospace Traffic Management 
 
The FAA is “considering a „Space and Air Traffic Management system (SATMS) that 
equitably supports both the evolving commercial space transportation industry and 
  
 
the mature and continuously growing aviation industry in a systematic, integrated manner.  
According to the FAA Aerospace Forecasts: Fiscal Years 2005-2016, this air traffic 
management system will include “…the people, infrastructure, policies, procedures, roles and 
regulations…under a single infrastructure” (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), FAA, 
Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, p.1). The issues and constraints of rescheduling a launch 
three weeks out or at the last minute will be an important part of the management systems 
decision support architecture. The U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of Aviation Policy and Plans 
specifies, “Launch and reentry plans…and launch/reentry window sizes, as important mission 
profile factors that impact the National Airspace System (NAS)” (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of 
Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 10). The necessity to reschedule launches impacts the NAS and needs 
to be clearly understood to support future commercial space transportation activities. 
Emerging Technologies 
 
Emerging technologies that will support the present and future NAS include the 
following: 
 Conflict Prediction/Resolution 
 
 Precise Scheduling Capabilities 
 
 Dynamic Airspace Configuration 
 
 Enhanced Weather Prediction 
 
 Trajectory Modeling 
 
 Simulation 
 
 Information Exchange/CDM tools 
 
 Cockpit display of traffic 
  
 
 Improved CNS 
 
 Automation and Displays 
 
 Decision Support Systems (DSS) System Performance Analysis Tools (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office 
of Policy and Plans, n.d., p.10) 
The 2009 Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts report states, “Planners will need fast 
time analysis capability and… [operational]… contingency plans” (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of 
Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 13-14). 
Humankind is learning about mission planning and scheduling by researching the insect 
world around us. Mendham and Clarke, through their research, realized, “In a highly dynamic 
environment, plans may quickly become out of date requiring constant rescheduling or 
frequent re-planning” (2004, p.1). 
Next Generation Spaceports 
 
Brown speaks to, “…spaceports that operate more like airports in support of routine 
commercial space transportation (2001, p. 680).” The logistics between launch site operator, 
launch vehicle operator/payload owner, spacecraft insertion point, transfer- orbit/s, launch 
control operations, and ground station operations is an elaborate schedule engineering feat.  
“Range systems must be configured, tested, corrected, adjusted, and retested repeatedly for 
every launch, making turnaround time between missions long and expensive, particularly 
between missions involving different types of launch vehicles 2001, p. 680)”. (Note: The 
Eastern Range (CCAFS) has experience turnaround times between 24-36 hours). Brown 
continues with concerns associated with extended delivery dates for “an automated planning 
and scheduling system for range facilities (2001, pp. 680-681)” speaking to technology 
obsolesce.  After fifty one years of safely supporting the Nation‟s space launch needs, the 
national test ranges are confronted with the challenge to rapidly change, to accommodate the 
growing commercial launch industry, or face obsolescence. 
  
The U.S. Air Force Space Command through its Range Integrated Product Team, “… 
addressed range turnaround times, scheduling systems, modernization programs, and range 
modernization (1998, p. 681)”. 
Brown expounds on The NextRange™ plan and states “Once complete, orbital traffic 
management and eventually interplanetary traffic management will be added (2001, p.682)”. 
Delivery of Cargo and People 
 
One of the universal concepts for Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) concerns 
scheduled and on demand delivery of cargo or people. Martin, J., Palmer, K., Chan, M. Karasi, 
A., and Glas, D.  state, “Looking into the future for schedule and on-demand service requiring 
suborbital or orbital delivery, will require a delivery management system/s (DMS) that are 
continually updating the launch date and time requirements” (1998, p.1). 
Martin, Palmer, et al. address the customer acceptable cost for fast package delivery 
(FPD) in relationship to the utility of time.  They state, “As with the Fast Package Delivery 
System, customer acceptable cost for FPD is dependent on the margin of utility of time (1998, 
p. 1). 
Time associated with horizontal processing, storage, and scheduling conflicts due to 
launch schedule slips or delays can create bottlenecking issues on and off the launch operations 
site. This impacts hardware, software, the human factor here on Earth, the point where the 
payload will be delivered, and the services it will be performing. 
Commercial launch schedule delays may be translated by commercial launch customers 
into a punctuality issue. There is a list from airline operations that could prove to be a 
beneficial baseline for spaceport operations.  Editors Butler and Keller published in the 
Handbook of Airline Operations, “The following outlines how to make punctuality a priority in 
the turnaround process and how to manage ongoing improvements in punctuality. 
1. The biggest punctuality levers are to be found in streamlined communication and a tailor-made 
turnaround process. 
  
2. A robust set of decision rules enables punctuality to be pursued realistically. 
3. Top management securing the commitment of all concerned parties is imperative. 
4. The only way to improve common processes in the future is through the committed teamwork 
of all concerned parties. 
5. Improved punctuality requires a punctuality manager and an empowered team with the 
appropriate mandate. 
6. Changing the mind-set and creating effective controls are prerequisites for anchoring improved 
punctuality in the organization. (2000, p.330) 
Demand and Forecasting 
 
According to the FAA Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 2005-2016, “…the GEO 
forecast also includes a realization factor that estimates the number of launches that will 
actually take place during the near-term portion of the model, to take into account the variance 
between forecasted demand and actual launches because of satellite and launch vehicle delays” 
(U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 1X-7). The factors that affect forecasting 
include “satellite manufacturing delays, launch vehicle component problems, launch failure 
investigations, manifest issues, regulatory issues, satellite export compliance, FCC licensing, 
and changes in the business environment that alter or cancel satellite development plans (U.S. 
DOT, FAA, Office of Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 1X-9). 
Operationally Responsive Space Components 
 
“The commercial space sector was synergistic with the defense space sector because 
both were interested in lower prices and dependable launch schedules (Moorman, 2000, p.8).  
The 2004 Assured Access to Space Study, a 1994 Space Launch Master Plan (SLMP) follow 
on study, focused on “outlining the milestones, options, and alternatives to improve further the 
national security launch posture” (Moorman, 2000, p.8) and included the impact of schedule 
slips in the study‟s demand model.  The actual number of flight rates is usually less than the 
original projections. The study included reliability, resiliency models, delineated Evolved 
  
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) options, and uncertainty, along with demand. The 
complexity associated with each factor, associated with each model, pointed to further analysis 
to define future viable options.  What was determined was the EELV demand was much less 
than previously projected.  What was not discussed was the rise in commercial payload 
owners choosing to launch their spacecraft from Russian or Chinese spaceports on foreign 
launch vehicles. 
Launch Vehicle Management and Mission Planning 
 
Launch vehicle management and mission planning evolve with each new mission 
program at the NASA, KSC. The Vehicle Management and Mission Planning System 
(VMMPS) proposed during the transitioning from the Apollo to the Shuttle program served as 
the system to meet the mission planning function requirements. Pruett and Bell state, “The use 
of this system will eliminate much redundancy and re-planning, shorten interface times 
between functions, and provide a means to evaluate unplanned events and modify 
schedules…flight operations must necessarily interface with all other elements of the program, 
methods must be developed to support these functions in an accurate, rapid, and economical 
manner…flight operations must be simplified and standardized without compromising mission 
success…tools must be developed that preclude the necessity for performing these functions 
(where possible) on a per mission basis (1973, p.1).” 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Basic VMMPS (Pruett and Bell, (1973) p.2) 
  
Pruett and Bell cite four mission process requirements: 
 
1. Missions should be standardized as much as possible 
 
2. The multiplying effect of mission plan changes must be minimized 
 
3. Organizational interfaces involved in mission design should be reduced 
 
4. The amount of documentation required for each mission should be reduced 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mission Types Composed of One or More Standard Mission Phases Each of 
Which Contains Numerous Procedures (Pruett & Bell, (1973) p. 3) 
 
Nichols details a study that included all of the federal government agencies involved with 
spacelift in 1994, “The National Spacelift Requirements Process (NSRP) was an attempt to 
provide top-level government inter-agency consensus of the Nation‟s spacelift requirements” 
(1995, p. 1).  As our Nation moves towards maturing commercial space transportation, the 
commercial launch vehicle providers together with the DOD and the NASA are redefining 
spacelift requirements using higher order technology and tailoring each mission to meet those 
requirements. 
  
Schedule Dependability is defined in Nichols‟ paper‟s appendix as “The ability of the 
system to consistently launch, and land if required, when planned (1995, p. A-3)”. 
The National Spacelift Requirements Working Group developed Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Characteristics of the Spacelift Mission (Nichols (1995) p.6) 
 
As illustrated, Schedule Dependability ranks first under the Operable function. Understanding 
the mean number of days between initial launch and actual launch and associated reschedule 
dates will enhance the Nation‟s vertical launch capability at Cape Canaveral Spaceport to meet 
that requirement. 
  
 
Summary 
 
The mean number of days associated with the initial launch date and the actual 
launch date will assist in understanding and architecting future systems that will make launch 
turnaround times, resources allocations scheduling, and cost efficiencies and effectiveness a 
reality from National spaceports that launch payloads on commercial launch vehicles. 
Punctuality, as one of the critical factors in the launch segment of any suborbital/orbital 
mission, or beyond, will determine the operational success of our National spaceports. 
Statement of the Hypothesis 
 
Based on the review of literature and personal experience, the following four 
hypotheses were posited for this study. 
Hypothesis 1: The mean number of days between initial launch date and actual launch 
date is more than three days. 
Hypothesis 2: The mean number of launch scheduled dates to launch is more than 
 
three. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The mean number of days between scheduled dates is more than 
 
three. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent. 
  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research Design 
 
This is a descriptive, quantitative research design based on historical hard data 
derived from the scheduled launch dates from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport (as logged by 
Spaceflight Now) and includes missions with actual scheduled launch dates within the 2008 
and 2009 time frame. 
Population 
 
The sample data was derived from missions where the actual scheduled launch 
date fell in the 2008 and 2009 time frame. There are some missions that started with an initial 
launch date in the 2007 time frame and concluded with a 2008 actual launch date. The 
missions beginning with an initial launch date in 2009 without completion of an actual launch 
date in 2009 are only included in the planned vs. actual percentage analysis. 
Sources of Data 
 
The Spaceflight Now website has capture launch schedule data from 2004 to 
present. The mission launch dates culminating in an actual launch in the 2008 and 2009 time 
frame were included in the data collected for this research. 
Treatment of the Data and Procedures 
 
The hard data was collected from Spaceflight Now website‟s Launch Schedule 
Log. The missions were identified as Mission 1, Mission 2…through Mission 24 to keep the 
focus on the scheduled launch dates per mission, time in days between scheduled launch dates 
per mission, and time in days from initial scheduled launch date to the actual launch date. 
Missions 25-27 were used for the planned vs. actual percentage analysis only. 
The initial scheduled launch date, reschedule date/s, and the actual launch date were 
entered into a Mission/Day Excel spreadsheet sequentially. Then, number of missions that 
launched on the initial launch date was visually determined from the Mission/Day spreadsheet.  
  
The remaining data provided the framework to determine the number of days between the 
initial and actual launch date and between each rescheduled launch date. The number of 
rescheduled launch dates after the initial date and the number of rescheduled launch dates 
between the initial and actual launch date were then calculated. The following descriptive 
statistics were then calculated based on the sample data. Each of the four calculations 
corresponds to one of the sub problems listed in Chapter I. 
1. Estimate the mean number of days between the initial launch date and the actual launch date. 
2. Estimate the mean number of scheduled dates to launch per mission. 
 
3. Estimate the mean number of days between the scheduled launch dates per mission. 
4. Investigate the percentage of planned scheduled launches vs. actual launches at Cape Canaveral 
Spaceport 
A 95% confidence interval was calculated as a population estimate for descriptive 
statistics 1. - 3. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean number of days between initial launch date and actual 
launch is more than three. A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null 
hypothesis that the mean number of days between initial scheduled and actual launch dates is 
more than three was initially planned. If the null was rejected and the sample mean was 
greater than three, the research hypothesis would have been supported. 
Hypothesis 2 states the number of scheduled launch dates per mission is greater than 
three was planned initially.  A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null 
hypothesis that the mean number of scheduled launch dates per mission is more than three.  If 
the null was rejected and the sample mean was greater than three, the research hypothesis 
would have been supported. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the mean number of days between scheduled launch dates is 
more than three.  A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null hypothesis 
that the mean number of days between each scheduled launch date per mission is more than 
  
three. If the null was rejected and the sample mean was greater than three, the research 
hypothesis would have been supported. 
Hypothesis 4 states that the percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent.  The Gooch Factor (referencing the 
percentage of predicted vs. actual launches from CCAFS and Vandenberg Air Force Base) 
states, “The actual number of flight rates is usually less than the original predictions…that the 
Nation only launches approximately 70 percent what it plans to launch (Moorman, 2006, p. 9). 
The number of “projected launch” missions scheduled for 2008 and 2009 (as derived from the 
Spaceflight Now Launch log date) versus actual launched missions, and the total number of 
launches was calculated. A test of proportions of Mean-One Sample was conducted, at .05 
Level of Significance.  If the null is rejected, the percentage of missions launched as planned 
will be seventy percent or less.  If the results fail to reject the null, the evidence will be 
sufficient to conclude the planned vs. actual launch percentage is greater than seventy percent 
for actual launches within the 2008-2009 timeframe at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. 
  
 
RESULTS 
 
The following results utilized the Table 1 Data Columns and are derived from the Statdisk 
Descriptive Statistical and Confidence Intervals analysis for sub problems 1-3 and Hypothesis 
Testing, Proportions One-Mean Sample for sub problem 4. 
 
 
Table 1. Statdisk Data Columns 
 
MISSION MEAN 
# of Days 
Between Initial & Actual 
MEAN 
# of Days Between 
Initial & Rescheduled Dates 
MEAN 
Number of 
Scheduled/Rescheduled Dates Per 
 
Mission 
1 133 17 8 
2 103 34 3 
3 2 1 1 
4 319 64 5 
5 37 19 2 
6 248 28 9 
7 58 15 4 
8 358 30 13 
9 90 30 3 
10 129 22 7 
11 267 89 3 
12 224 27 9 
13 279 47 6 
14 233 26 9 
15 440 40 11 
16 61 12 5 
17 279 140 2 
18 55 6 9 
19 53 27 2 
20 670 48 14 
21 115 29 4 
22 4 4 0 
23 40 20 2 
24 66 13 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Hypothesis 1 and Sub problem 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean number of days between initial launch date and actual 
launch, or the number of days between scheduled dates, is more than three. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Statdisk Descriptive Statistics Problem 1 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 5. The 95% confidence 
interval was (110,245). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than 
three, supporting the research hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Statdisk Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 1 
 
  
Sample Size, n: 24 
Mean: 177.625 
St Dev, s: 160.7966 
 
95% Confident the population mean is within the range: 
109.7002 < mean <245.4998 
  
 
Hypothesis 2 and Sub problem 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the mean number of launch schedule dates is more than three. The 
analysis indicates that the mean number of launch schedule dates is 6 dates per mission. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Descriptive Statistics Problem 2 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95% confidence 
interval was (4, 8). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than three, 
supporting the research hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 2 
  
Sample Size, n: 24 
Mean: 5.666 
St Dev, s: 3.8410 
 
95% Confident the population mean is within the range: 
4.31095 < mean <7.68905 
  
Hypothesis 3 and Sub problem 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the mean number of days between rescheduled dates is more than three. 
The analysis indicates that the mean number of days between rescheduled dates is 33 days. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Statdisk Descriptive Statistics Problem 3 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95% confidence interval 
was (20, 45). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than three, 
supporting the research hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 9 Statdisk Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 3 
  
Sample Size, n: 24 
Mean: 32.833 
St Dev, s: 29.9980 
 
95% Confident the population mean is within the range: 
20.13212 < mean <45.46788 
  
PLANNED 
ACTUAL 
Cape Canaveral Spaceport 
Planned vs Actual Launches, 2008-09 
30 
89% 
20 89% 
10 88% 
0 
 
PLANNED
ACTUAL 
2008 
8 
7 
2009 
19 
17 
TOTAL 
27 
24 
Hypothesis 4 Sub problem 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that the percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent. 
The analysis for each year and for the combined years, 2008-2009, result in an eighty-eight 
percent (88%) launch rate for missions scheduled in 2008, an eighty-nine percent (89%) launch 
rate for missions scheduled in 2009, and an eighty-nine percent (89%) launch rate for missions 
with scheduled launches in the 2008-2009 timeframe. 
 
 
Figure 10. Statdisk Hypothesis Testing, One-Mean Sample Problem 4 
Table 2. Planned Versus Actual Launches, 2008-2009 
 
Claim:   p > p(hyp) 
Sample proportion: 0.8888889 
Test Statistic, z: 2.1418 
Critical z: 1.6449 
P-Value: 0.0161 
90% Confidence interval: 
0.7894062 < p < 0.9883716 
Reject the Null Hypothesis 
Sample provides evidence to support the claim 
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION 
The researcher‟s „3 days‟ as a mean value for launch scheduling humans, goods, 
and services into orbit or beyond was a civilian, outside-the- launch- scheduling realm was a 
„best‟ guess. The 70% Gooch Factor associated with Hypothesis 4 and Sub problem 4 was 
referenced from the literature review. To the researcher‟s knowledge this is the first time 
research has been conducted on the launch schedule dates at the Cape Canaveral Spaceport. 
The reason for this data collection was to determine the existing parameters associated with 
launch schedules at both the KSC and the CCAFS to make the proper assessments concerning 
scheduling future commercial launch and payload resource allocations. 
Hypothesis 1 and Sub problem 1 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate. The data used in the calculation 
is summarized in Table 1.  The 95% confidence interval is (110, 245). Therefore, the null is 
rejected and the sample mean is greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis. The 
best estimate was calculated at 178 days. The researcher is 95% confident that the number of 
days between an initial and actual launch date is no less than 110 and no more than 245. The 
confidence interval for the number of days between the initial and actual launch date (110,245) 
is a wide interval because of the large variance (standard deviation). The actual range of is 2-
670 days. Remember each mission was analyzed only by schedule dates and in days. While 
collecting the data, the researcher discerned the variety of timelines had no apparent 
commonality. 
Hypothesis 2 and Sub problem 2 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 9. The 95% 
confidence interval was (4, 8). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is 
greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis. 
The best estimate was calculated at 6 days. The researcher is 95% confident that the 
  
number of reschedule dates per mission is no less than 4 and no more than 8. The mean of 6 
reschedule dates (approximately one week) is approximately 2 times greater than what 
Hypothesis I states. The actual range of is 0-14 days. Remember each mission was analyzed 
only by schedule dates and in days. While collecting the data, the researcher discerned the 
variety of timelines had no apparent commonality. 
Hypothesis 3 and Sub problem 3 
 
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95% 
confidence interval was (20, 45). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is 
greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis The analysis indicates that the mean 
number of days between rescheduled dates is 33 days. 
Hypothesis 4 and Sub problem 4 
 
The Gooch Factor speaks to 70% of predicted launches, actually launching from the 
Eastern and Western Ranges in the USA, analyzing a 10 year time frame. Due to the small 
sample size of only 2 years at the KSC and CCAFS (Eastern Range) the data is not comparable, 
but the 70% percentage was noted as a reference point and used in the Hypothesis 4 and Sub 
problem 4. The percentage of predicted launches that actually launched from the Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport in 2008 was 88% and in 2009 89%. For the 2008-2009 combined 
timeframe the percentage was 89%. The proportions test illustrates the percentage of actual 
launches is significantly higher than the Gooch factor of 70%. This researcher is 95% 
confident of that conclusion. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Major conclusions based on this research are the following (by hypothesis): 
 
1. The average number of days between the initial and actual launch dates is between 110 and 245 
days. 
2. The average number of scheduled launch dates per mission is between 4-8 days. 
  
 
3. The average number of days between scheduled launch dates per mission is 20-45 days. 
4. The percentage of actual launches is higher than the Gooch factor implied. Each hypothesis in 
this study was supported by the research analysis using 
Descriptive Statistics and Confidence Intervals, Mean-One Sample for Hypothesis 1-3 and 
Hypothesis Testing, Proportion – One Sample for Hypothesis 4. The data collection and 
statistical analysis results validate the long timelines associated with the aerospace industry and 
the iterative nature of launch scheduling/rescheduling at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. Of the 24 
missions that launch in the 2008-2009 timeframe, not one mission launched without a 
reschedule date. 
The mean number of days between the initial scheduled and actual launch dates of 178 
days (approximately one half of a year) is a significant factor in that it is approximately 60 
times greater than what the research hypothesized, as an outsider to vertical launch scheduling.  
The longer timeline validates the unique attributes associated with vertical launch space 
transportation.  The longest timeline of 670 days to the shortest timeline of 2 days illustrates the 
chasm of time between the two extremes.  These timeline variations clearly separate vertical 
launch vehicle space transportation from traditional modes of transportation. 
The mean number of scheduled/rescheduled dates per mission is 6 schedule/reschedule 
dates. These numbers are the number of reschedule iterations that should be considered when 
planning and creating forecasting models. This data illustrates the number of times all 
schedulers could conceivably be required to reschedule a launch. Two of the launches have 0 
scheduled dates between the Initial and Actual Date.  These numbers are the number of 
iterations between the initial launch date and the actual launch date that should be considered 
when planning and creating forecasting models.  This data illustrates the number of times all 
schedulers could conceivably be required to reschedule a launch from shortest to longest case 
scenarios, as represented within the 2008-2009 timeframe. 
  
The mean number of days between the initial scheduled launch date and each 
subsequent reschedule date per mission is 33 days (approximately a month), with the range of 
1-140 days.  The mean and range values provide baselines for monthly demand on processing 
and storage facilities for launch vehicles stages and payloads, as well as launch pad 
coordination for pads serving multiple launch vehicle customers. 
The planned vs. actual launch percentage results of greater than 70% indicate a positive 
trend, eighty-nine percent (89%) for all actual launches from Cape Canaveral Spaceport within 
the 2008-2009 time frame. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research is only the beginning of constructive research focused on determining the 
function of launch scheduling for commercial space transportation. Similar to aviation moving 
from government control to commercial control (with government law, rules and regulation, 
and oversight) commercial space launch research is wide open. Someone should conduct 
similar research using the KSC and CCAFS historical data for launch scheduling. This 
research showed commercial launch and payload customers should expect reschedule dates 
between the initial and actual launch dates. 
Reschedule dates are to be expected and crews and effected operation schedulers 
should build in flex-time to compensate for other contracted mission reschedule dates.  
Spaceport operations teams, resource allocations schedulers, and spectators need to plan 
accordingly. Cost research could drive innovative spaceport processes development.  Space 
transportation should not be thought of in the same sense as Earth modes of transportation.  
Multimodal hub interface research to support future planning costs, collaborative 
modernization and enhancement of existing infrastructure, air traffic control scheduling and 
costs, highway traffic impact, shipping traffic scheduling and costs, geophysical impacts to 
launch scheduling, and researching the feasibility of a multi-governmental agency decision 
management system to support in coordinating all national launch activities should be 
  
considered.  There are many opportunities for further research concerning the scheduling of 
space transportation launching from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport. No other location on Earth 
has the diversity of legacy launch vehicles and payloads, with supporting infrastructure and 
trained personnel. When the next solar storm hits the Earth‟s assets in space, there could be a 
marked increase in launch and payload demand. Future research should be conducted 
addressing the optimal launch scheduling capacity employing the current assets at the Cape 
Canaveral Spaceport and how that capacity could be increased to meet the demand for payload 
delivery to re-establish space technology services. The scheduling of human spaceflight, goods 
and services to support commercial requirements versus the NASA and DoD requirements 
opens many avenues for future research as well. 
This research could be utilized as a baseline for future research to determine what 
direction launch scheduling at the Cape Canaveral Spaceport is headed.  But for now, the 
results can be used to inform customers and forecast future scheduling parameters, to keep the 
costs of operating launch pads, payload processing facilities, crews, and supporting activities in 
check, maximize resource allocations. 
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